Goderis and Versteeg on "The Transnational Origins of Constitutions: An Empirical Investigation"

Abstract

Constitutions are commonly described as inherently national products, shaped by domestic politics and reflecting the views and values of the nation. This paper develops and empirically tests a different hypothesis, which is that constitutions are also shaped by transnational influences, or “diffusion.” Constitutional provisions can diffuse through four possible mechanisms: Competition, coercion, learning and acculturation. Using a new panel dataset based on our coding of 108 constitutional rights in 188 countries over the period 1946-2006, we estimate a spatial lag model to explain the adoption of constitutional rights. We find that constitution-makers are affected by countries with whom they 1) share a common legal origin, 2) compete for foreign aid, 3) share a common religion, and 4) share colonial ties. Common language, common borders, trade relationships and shared export markets, amongst other things, do not generally explain the diffusion of constitutional rights. While constitutional rights of partner countries are important predictors of constitutional design, international treaty commitments do not affect the constitution. 

 

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1906707