The Constitutional Dilemma of European Integration
1998
Abstract:
The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.
The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: prisoners dilemma, constitutions, constitutional economics, public choice, European Union
JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D62
Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1973504
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