Game Theory and the Structure of Administrative Law

Yehonatan Givati 

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law
October 30, 2013

University of Chicago Law Review, 2014 Forthcoming 
Abstract:      

How should administrative agencies choose among the different policymaking instruments at their disposal? Although the administrative law literature has explored this question with respect to the instruments of adjudication and rulemaking, it has failed to appreciate two other powerful instruments at agencies’ disposal: advance ruling and licensing. Taking these four policymaking instruments into consideration, this Article provides a general theory to guide agencies in selecting the most suitable policymaking instrument in different policy environments. To do so, the Article utilizes a new game-theoretic framework, focusing on two central dimensions of policymaking instruments in particular: timing and breadth. This framework provides two valuable implications. First, it highlights two key administrative challenges that are underappreciated by the academic literature: the hold-up and leniency problems. And second, the framework shows that administrative agencies are underutilizing two powerful policy making instruments, namely, licensing and advanced rulings. I argue that these two instruments area valuable across areas of law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Administrative Law, Policymaking Instrument

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347310