venerdì 24 gennaio 2014

Why are Americans Originalist?

Jack M. Balkin 

Yale University - Law School

January 14, 2014

LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL, David Schiff and Richard Nobles, eds. (Ashgate Publishing, 2015 Forthcoming) 

This brief essay, addressed to scholars outside the United States, attempts to explain why originalism is popular in debates over the American federal Constitution. If as its advocates sometimes maintain, originalism is the most legitimate method of interpretation in a democracy, one would expect advocates in every constitutional democracy in the world to demand that judges use it. Yet although originalism has made inroads in Australia and a few other countries, it is largely ignored elsewhere in the world. Although the “thin” version of original meaning advocated in Living Originalism would not be particularly controversial in most constitutional democracies, "thicker" versions of originalism that require judges to follow how a constitution's adopters would have understood or applied the text have little influence outside the United States or even in the interpretation of the fifty indigenous state constitutions. Originalism’s authority in debates about the American federal Constitution rests on cultural factors rather than a unique American commitment to the rule of law or popular sovereignty.

American originalism is primarily a nationalist idea. It arises from distinctive features of American cultural memory -- namely, that in popular imagination the American nation was created by Americans themselves through a self-conscious act of political revolution, and that the American nation, people, and constitution came into being more or less simultaneously through this initial act of self-creation. A similar story is not told in most other political cultures. This story has helped encourage Americans’ special veneration of the founding generation and particular figures within that generation (like George Washington and James Madison) as culture heroes.

The self-conscious invocation of originalism as a general theory of interpretation is relatively recent; it is a response to constitutional modernity, in which Americans found themselves increasingly distanced from the past and sought to justify political reforms. Academic theories of originalism proliferated in American law schools in response to the political uses of originalism in the twentieth century. Yet as these theories have become increasingly sophisticated there is often little connection between them, the popular uses of originalism, and the way that originalist arguments are actually deployed (or ignored) by practicing lawyers and judges.

Americans use originalism as a political practice for critiquing the status quo (whether in a liberal or conservative direction) and arguing for change, sometimes quite radical. Appeals to origins serve as a precedent-breaking device -- they help justify a break from current practices by appealing to an even older tradition. This explains a little-understood fact about American originalism. The originators of originalism as a self-conscious approach to interpretation were not movement conservatives -- they were New Deal liberals. The increase in citations to originalist materials in Supreme Court opinions begins with Justice Hugo Black and the Warren Court. New Deal liberals committed to judicial restraint needed a way to justify exercising judicial review to protect individual rights. They turned to history to do so. Movement conservatives, who sought to break from liberal precedents, then flipped the political valence of originalism; they were so successful that originalism's origins as a liberal justificatory device have largely been forgotten.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Originalism, interpretation, constitution, American culture, cultural memory, culture heroes, modernity

The New Guidelines on Freedom of Religion and LGBTI Rights in the External Action of the European Union

Pasquale Annicchino 

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

December 16, 2013

European Human Rights Law Review, 6, 2013, pp. 624-630 

The European Union has recently joined a wider group of states that promote human rights in their foreign policy. Two recent documents approved by the European Council on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion and belief and LGBTI rights offer new material for the discussion on the role of human rights in the external relations of the European Union. The challenge for the EU will be to find a new balance and coherence between the protection of human rights within the EU and policies to advance human rights abroad.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Religious Freedom, European Union, European External Action Service, Freedom of Religion and Belief, LGBTI rights

Formalism Versus Flexibility in the Law of Treaties

Jean D'Aspremont 

University of Manchester - School of Law; University of Amsterdam

January 5, 2014

Jean d'Aspremont. "Formalism versus Flexibility in the Law of Treaties " in C. Tams, A. Tzanakopoulos and A. Zimmermann (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties, Edward Elgar, 2014
Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2013-27
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-78 

This contribution aims to show that the dominance of formalism in treaty law is much more nuanced and qualified than the general perception sketched out in the preceding paragraph suggests. It will be argued that from its making to its termination, a treaty see-saws between formalism and flexibility, and that the body of rules designed by international lawyers to regulate the life of treaties mirrors this constant oscillation: the law of treaties, as codified in the two Vienna Conventions, displays both formal rationality and flexibility. This chapter aims to shed some light on the various, and disparate, features of this fundamental tension.

It is more specifically submitted here that the oscillation between formal rationality and flexibility comes to a head at three different levels: at the moment of the creation of the treaty, at the moment of its validation and identification as a treaty properly so-called and, finally, at the moment of its application, that is when the provisions of a treaty are confronted with the facts and accordingly need to be interpreted. At each of these stages, the tension between formal structures and flexibility is solved according to a different equilibrium. The different balances struck are themselves unstable and in a constant state of flux, for they are treaty-dependent and have not been definitively concretized by the rules of the Vienna Conventions. It is true that the constant oscillation between formalism and flexibility also infuses the rules on suspension and termination. However, as suspension and termination form the subject of a separate contribution, the ‘un-making’ of treaties will be addressed only briefly.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: International Law, Sources of International Law, Law of Treaties, Treaty-Making, Formalism, Deformalization, Flexibility, Interpretation, Systemic Integration, Fragmentation, Theory of Sources

In Defense of Expansive Interpretation in the ECHR

Shai Dothan 

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

January 16, 2014

Forthcoming CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
GlobalTrust Working Paper Series 01/2014 

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) applies a series of interpretive techniques that systematically expand states' human rights obligations far beyond the obligations states took upon themselves by ratifying the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Some commentators argue that this practice is illegitimate because states represent their citizens and their decision not to undertake certain human rights obligations should be respected. This paper argues that expansive interpretation is nonetheless legitimate in two important situations which often occur in the international arena. First, in situations where most states would have subscribed to the additional obligation but for a minority of states that use their veto power to prevent an amendment of the Convention, expansive interpretation will bring the states' actions into better alignment with their own desires and the desires of their citizens. Second, in situations where democratic failures lead states to misrepresent the interests of individuals affected by their human rights policies, expansive interpretation can help align the policies of states with the true interests of the citizens they represent. Although the paper does not provide a general justification for expansive interpretation, it does suggest that in certain limited contexts where the conditions identified above hold, it might well serve the goals of international law and international courts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, Treaty Interpretation

Two Conceptions of Democracy in the Council of the EU: Narrow and Broad

Maarten Zbigniew Hillebrandt 

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance

January 17, 2014

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2014-02
Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2014-01 

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Council is explicitly understood as a democratic actor in a decision-making system that is legitimated on the basis of a democratic rationale. While this formalisation in the Lisbon Treaty of the Council as a democratic actor is to be welcomed as an important step in a longer-standing process, it remains unclear which normative requirements result from it. This point is illustrated in this paper with reference to the principle of transparency. It discerns the role of transparency in two competing conceptions at the Council level, representing a narrow, and a broad perspective on democracy. It is argued that below a minimal threshold of transparency, Council democracy cannot function. Above this threshold, in turn, transparency is likely to make Council democracy function better.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: democracy, transparency, Council of the EU, democratic theory

Should Citizenship Be for Sale?

Ayelet Shachar 

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Rainer Baubock 

European University Institute

January 2014

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. 2014/01 

On 12 November 2013 the Maltese Parliament decided to offer Maltese and European citizenship at the price of € 650,000, but implementation of the law has been postponed due to strong domestic and international critiques. On 23 December, the Maltese government announced significant amendments, including a higher total amount of € 1,150,000, part of which has to be invested in real estate and government bonds. Several other European states have adopted ‘golden passport’ programmes. Should citizenship be for sale? In November 2013 EUDO CITIZENSHIP invited Ayelet Shachar of the University of Toronto Law School to open a debate on these controversial policies. Twelve authors have contributed short commentaries, most of which refer to the initial law adopted by the Maltese Parliament. An executive summary by Rainer Bauböck provides an overview over the main questions raised in our forum. For further information on investor citizenship programmes see Jelena Dzankic’s EUDO CITIZENSHIP working paper on the topic and consult the news section of our observatory.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Citizenship acquisition, investor citizenship programmes, European citizenship, commodification, Malta

L’Autonomie De L’Individu Européen Et La Question Du Statut (The Autonomy of the European Individual and the Question of Status)

Loïc Azoulai 

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

December 1, 2013

EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2013/14 

French Abstract: Le droit de l’Union parle plusieurs langues, mais celle qui lui est la plus usuelle est la langue des droits subjectifs. La tendance du droit européen à produire des droits a un fonction de légitimation depuis les origines de la construction européenne. Ces droits donnent aux ressortissants des Etats membres la faculté de s’émanciper des formes d’assujettissement liées à l’Etat. Cependant, elle a aussi désormais des effets délégitimants. Nous nous rendons compte à présent que la production de droits et d’autonomie est facteur d’individualisme et d’indétermination ; elle conduit à la déstabilisation de certains dispositifs de cohésion sociale au sein des Etats membres. Partant de ce constat, cette étude a un double objet. Elle analyse, d’une part, le système des droits sur lequel repose le droit de l’Union, ses limites et ses contradictions. D’autre part, elle recherche dans le droit de l’Union des éléments susceptibles de remédier à certaines de ces contradictions. Elle s’appuie pour ce faire sur le concept de statut qui est récemment apparu dans la jurisprudence sur la citoyenneté de l’Union.

English Abstract: A powerful narrative exists in European Union Law that argues that the Union and its main legal actor, the European Court of Justice, have placed the individual at the centre of the European project. The creation of the European individual (worker/consumer/producer/employer...) is largely the result of a legal technique which consists in granting individuals with subjective rights opposable to the Member States. EU legislation and jurisprudence are replete with such rights. In the past two decades, the language of market rights has developed in the grammar and semantic of citizenship rights. This paper is an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of this construction by relying on the concept of status. A concept of status has recently emerged in the case law of the European Court of Justice. The paper argues that, beyond its purely rhetorical value, the concept may be constructed in normative terms so as to offer a new conceptualization of individual autonomy at the EU level. A conception that preserves the emancipatory character of EU law but is more sensitive to the protection of affected interests.
Note: Downloadable document is in French.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: EU law, subjective rights, individual autonomy, status, European Court of Justice

Resolving Conflicts between Competition and Other Values: The Roles of Courts and Other Institutions in the U.S. and the E.U.

Douglas H. Ginsburg 

George Mason University School of Law

Daniel E. Haar 

Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice

January 17, 2014

European Competition Law Annual 2012: Public Policies, Regulation and Economic Distress, Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., Hart Publishing, Forthcoming 2014
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-01 

In this essay we compare and contrast the methods used by courts and other institutions in the United States and in the European Union to resolve the conflicts that inevitably arise between competition law and other laws, policies, and values. In the U.S., because its generally-worded antitrust statutes give judges great interpretive freedom, the courts, in the course of deciding concrete disputes, play a large role in defining the boundary between antitrust and other bodies of law. In the E.U., competition law is effectively “constitutional” by virtue of its being part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as a result of which the courts are more constrained in what they can do. At the same time, the Treaty permits the E.U.’s enforcement agency, the Directorate-General for Competition, to issue ex ante exemptions that serve to mediate between competition law and other laws and values. Flexibility is among the chief virtues of the U.S. approach to the reconciliation of conflicting concerns. The E.U. approach is less flexible but may provide greater predictability for private actors.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: balancing, block exemption, Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, DG Comp, economic efficiency, executive branch agency, expertise, flexibility, implied repeal doctrine, irreconcilable goals, judges, legislature, preclusion, state action immunity, TFEU Article 101(3), uncertainty

Models of Subnational Constitutionalism

Jonathan L Marshfield 

University of Arkansas 


Penn State Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 4, 2011 

This article considers an overlooked issue of constitutional design. Some federal systems decentralize law-making and administrative power without allowing subnational governments to adopt their own constitutions that structure or limit subnational power. Other federal systems allow subnational units some discretion in structuring and limiting their powers by adopting subnational constitutions. Although scholars and constitution-makers have developed various theories regarding the utilities of decentralizing law-making and administrative powers, they have not separately considered the utilities or normative justifications for decentralizing constitutional choices. This Article takes up that important but neglected question. The goal is to move towards a systematization and critical analysis of possible justifications for introducing subnational constitutionalism into federal systems. By modeling plausible consequences associated with subnational constitutionalism, the Article aims to assist contemporary constitution makers considering federal arrangements.

The Article first offers a description of subnational constitutionalism that is derived from rational-choice theories of political institutions and a survey of the world’s federal systems. It concludes that subnational constitutionalism is best described as a series of rules (both formal and informal) that protect and define the authority of subnational units within a federal system to exercise some degree of independence in structuring and/or limiting the political power reserved to them by the federation. Building upon that working description, the Article argues that there are at least three coherent justifications for subnational constitutionalism. First, it can deepen a federal system’s ability to accommodate multiple political communities within a single constitutional regime. Second, it can uniquely contribute to federalism’s liberty-protecting, check-and-balances function. Third, the Article argues that scholars have largely overlooked the possibility that subnational constitutionalism can improve the deliberative quality of democracy within subnational units and the federal system as a whole.

The Article concludes with a brief assessment of the contemporary role of state constitutions within the U.S. federal system.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: subnational constitution, subnational constitutionalism, justifications for subnational constitutionalism, federalism, federal theory, democracy, deliberative democracy, republicanism, constitutionalism, subnational and national relationship, subnational influences, institutional design

Les régions d’Europe: une extrême diversité institutionnelle (European Regions: Extreme Institutional Diversity)

Gérard-François Dumont 

University of Paris 4 Sorbonne

January 11, 2014

Diploweb (2014) 

French Abstract: De façon localisée, précise et référencée, ce texte analyse la diversité institution-nelle de l’Europe. Il démontre combien l’organisation régionale de l’Union européenne est contradictoire. D’une part, les régions, quelle que soit leur nature, bénéficient de fa-çon égale du cadre réglementaire communautaire de la politique régionale de l’Union européenne et, à ce titre, sont traitées comme si elles étaient semblables. D’autre part, l’examen des Constitutions et des réglementations nationales des différents pays euro-péens montre qu’elles ne s’alignent nullement sur un mode institutionnel identique. La question régionale en Europe entre donc dans le respect du principe de subsidiarité.

English Abstract: Localized manner, accurate and referenced, this text analyzes the institutional diversity of Europe. It demonstrates how the regional organization of the European Union is contradictory. On the one hand, regions, whatever their nature, enjoy equal fa-Con Community regulatory framework of the regional policy of the European Union and, as such, are treated as if they were similar. On the other hand, the review of constitutions and national legislation of different European countries shows that they are aligned in the same way institutional mode. Regional issue in Europe therefore falls within the principle of subsidiarity.
Note: Downloadable document is in French.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Regional and local Governance; Local government and local Development; Geography; European Studies; European Union

The Role of Contextual Meaning in Judicial Interpretation

Jonathan Crowe 

The University of Queensland - T.C. Beirne School of Law

January 19, 2014

Federal Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 417-442, 2013 

This article examines the relevance to judicial interpretation of contextual meaning: the meaning legal texts hold when considered in full light of their social and moral context. I argue first that, as a descriptive matter, contextual meaning is necessarily prior to any more restricted form of textual interpretation; that is, the contextual meaning of a legal text is its ordinary meaning. I then contend that, as a normative matter, judges should presumptively apply ordinary or contextual meaning when construing legal materials. The remainder of the article explores the nature and limitations of the contextualist model of judicial practice. The possibility of conflicts between contextual factors at different levels of abstraction makes it necessary to distinguish narrow and wide versions of the contextualist methodology. I argue that wide contextualism offers the best overall account of judicial interpretation. I conclude by examining the practical and normative limitations of this model.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Meaning, interpretation, context, judging, Heidegger, Gadamer, Goldsworthy

Public Morals and the ECHR

Roberto Perrone 

University of Ferrara

January 20, 2014

University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-02 

The instruments for the protection of rights and fundamental liberties, both in a national and in an international context, constantly feature the presence of dispositions which allow the limitation of such rights in order to safeguard certain interests. Among these interests frequently appears the protection of ‘public morals’. This phrase, or similar expressions, are present not only in many constitutional charters, but also in several international covenants aimed at protecting human rights. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth: the ECHR) is not an exception in this context: In the text, indeed, the ‘morals’ are mentioned as a legitimate aim that justifies the restriction of some rights granted by the Convention itself. More precisely, the clause is referred to in articles 6.1, 8.2., 9.2, 10.2, 11.2, concerning respectively the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for ‘ private and family life, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the freedom of expression, and the freedom of assembly and association; moreover, the clause is mentioned at art 2.3 of the Fourth Additional Protocol to the Convention, concerning freedom of movement. The general clause in discourse, therefore, might be called upon in order to justify limitations to several important rights. To avoid arbitrary restrictions to these rights, it is important to understand its meaning and to single out its scope and its boundaries.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: European Law, Human Rights, Public Morals

Saving the Euro, Securing Childcare: The Fiscal Compact and Its Gendered Impact in Germany

Gabriele Abels 

University of Tuebingen - Department of Political Science

Julia Lepperhoff 

Protestant University of Applied Sciences

June 25, 2013

The European Union has issued recommendations and benchmarks on the provision of childcare facilities in the member states. In this field Germany is still one of the laggards. In response, federal laws have been adopted in the last few years implementing EU soft law. According to German federal law, children ages one to three years have a legal right to a place in day care. This entitlement becomes effective in August 2013. It has to be implemented by the German Länder and their local authorities, which are operating under tight budgetary constraints; hence, compliance with the law is fiscally not secure. Recently, the negotiations over the Fiscal Compact provided the German Länder with a unique opportunity structure. In accordance with constitutional and legal requirements, the adoption of the Fiscal Compact and ESM needs a two-thirds majority in both legislative chambers. Via their seats in the Bundesrat, the governments of the German Länder employed their bargaining power to receive financial subsidies from the federal government earmarked for childcare services. As a result this will boost the financial capacities of municipalities to meet federal and EU requirements for the provision especially of crèches. This is a remarkable multi-level package deal in favour of better childcare, thus, improving the situation, especially for working mothers in Germany.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: European Union, Germany, Fiscal Compact, social policy, gender

The Virtue of Cassis De Dijon 25 Years Later – It is Not Dead, It Just Smells Funny

K. P. Purnhagen 

Wageningen UR - Law and Governance Group; Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics

January 22, 2014

Wageningen Working Papers in Law and Governance 2014/01 

This piece specifies how and where the Cassis de Dijon case influenced EU internal market regulation. For a start, I will place the case into the more general context of internal market integration (1). I will then highlight the different concepts that have been developed from the Cassis de Dijon case such as e.g. the theory of the information paradigm, the confident consumer, the principle of mutual recognition, and the “new approach”. I will show how each of these concepts has developed in the course of internal market law (2). Finally, I will conclude that albeit that these principles have come under attack from various sources, the lessons drawn from Cassis de Dijon still remain the yardstick for the evaluation of internal market law today (3). I have to apologize for the lack of modesty by relying occasionally on works that I have published earlier. I take this contribution also as an opportunity to react to criticism on previous publications of mine by putting them into the more general context of internal market regulation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Cassis de Dijon, internal market regulation, information paradigm, confident consumer

martedì 14 gennaio 2014

Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Fundamental Rights

Tobias Lock 

University of Edinburgh School of Law

January 8, 2014

Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2014/02 

This is a submission to the United Kingdom’s Balance of Competence Review on EU fundamental rights. It provides answers to a catalogue of questions compiled by the Ministry of Justice. The questions revolve around the impact (application) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom, in particular the UK’s “opt-out” of the Charter and the case law by domestic courts on the Charter so far. It also discusses the differences in the fundamental rights protection provided by the Charter and by the HRA 1998 and the indirect effects the Charter has on the UK legal order. In addition, a short answer is provided to a question concerning the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Furthermore, the submission highlights some legal and cultural challenges for the application of the Charter in the UK.

Keywords: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Scope of EU Law; Protocol No. 30; HRA 1998; UK Case Law

giovedì 2 gennaio 2014

The Law's Two Sides and Their Benefits: Domestic to International Context (and from Hamdan to Al Jedda)

Gianluigi Palombella 

University of Parma - Faculty of Law; Robert Schuman Center, European University Institute

December 15, 2013

This chapter maintains that when the law lives up to the ideal of the rule of law, it is organized so to display two internal sides, that are in a mutual tension and concurring with different contents in the legal order as a whole. Thus, as history and comparative institutional analysis show, there is a part of the law that is not under the jurisgenerative power of the sovereign. This feature of law as duality (in the same sense as the medieval jurisdictio and gubernaculum couple) represents a scheme that prevents domination from being perpetrated through the monopoly of law. Such an essential aspect of law -- if it has been realized in the concrete reality of a legal order -- has a normative import that can be measured also beyond the State. It means that sheer exercise of democratic sovereignty is not a sufficient reason for justifying infringement of international law. But in as much as the rule of law is not reducible to compliance to whatever rules, it means as well that the sovereign exercise of rule-making power by the UN Security Council cannot per sé unconditionally oblige State legal orders to infringing, say, fundamental rights.

Even in the beyond-the-State setting, a recurrent struggle between the supremacy of sources and the substance of legal contents -- available in the relevant system of norms -- takes place. Different patterns have been under scrutiny: from Hamdan case at the US Supreme Court to Al Jedda at the European Court of Human Rights. And only the latter seems to suggest a new way of reasoning, one that reinstates the Rule of law as a notion actually controlling a reflexive and balanced legal answer, beyond the imperative of compliance with the will of the most powerful source of law. Finally, being a notion different from sheer respect for human rights or democracy, and one that deals with a peculiar configuration of law, it would be even too narrow the assumption that the rule of law simply boils down to benefit individuals (against States that should not "be entitled" to its "benefits").

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

mercoledì 1 gennaio 2014

A (Dis-)Order of Disagreements: Exploring the Nature of Constitutional Conflicts in EU Law

Giuseppe Martinico 

Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales, Madrid; Centre for Studies on Federalism (CSF); Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa

December 30, 2013

STALS (Sant'Anna Legal Studies) Research Paper 3/2013 

This paper deals with the important role played by constitutional conflicts (i.e. conflicts between EU law primacy and constitutional supremacy) in European law. This work is divided into three parts: in the first part I shall briefly present my view on Art. 4.2 TEU. This provision has been described as the codification of a new concept primacy and a basis for a more cooperative phase among courts. I think this clause represents the apex of a broader process but at the same time I do not perceive this process (of partial convergence) as a progressive route towards pacification in the relationship between constitutional poles (or levels, employing another terminology ). On the contrary, in my view constitutional conflicts are and will remain central in the evolution of EU law.

Starting from this premise, in the second part I shall offer a classification of constitutional conflicts. Finally, some conclusive thoughts will be presented on the destiny of these conflicts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: constitutional conflicts, convergence, national identity, constitutional courts, CJEU